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ANTIMERGER CRITERIA: POWER, CONCENTRATION.
FORECLOSURE AND SIZE*
GEORGE R. HALL-* AND CHARLES

F.

PHILLIPS, JR."

THE "NEW"

MERGER POLICY is now thirteen years old and,
like human adolescents, active, strong, and willing to "rush in
where angels fear to tread." Its past accomplishments and future
potential are impressive. While the ghost of Senator Sherman may
sit at the board meetings of most large corporations, the shadowy
figures of Congressman Celler and the late Senator Kefauver sit much
nearer the head of the table.' As Markham has summarized: "The
most important recent anti-trust development from the viewpoint of
managerial decision making is the tightening up of the prohibition
'2
against corporate mergers and acquisitions."
The current importance of the Celler-Kefauver Act3 calls for an
appraisal of present antimerger doctrine and its future development.
The courts have applied a market power standard to test the legality
of horizontal consolidations. More recently, however, market power
has been equated with market concentration. This development has
vital implications for the future impact of merger policy. Perhaps of
even more importance is how the doctrines developed for horizontal
mergers among industrial firms are to be extended to non-horizontal
mergers and mergers in the regulated industries.4 The present state
of merger policy will be reviewed first, and then possible future developments will be considered.
* The comments and suggestions of Professors M. A. Adelman and Almarian
Phillips are acknowledged with appreciation. The analysis and conclusions, however,
are the sole responsibility of the authors.
t B.A., 1951, Claremont Men's College; M.A., 1953, Ph.D., 1960, Harvard University; Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System (Banking Market Unit,
Division of Research and Statistics).
t" B.A., 1956, University of New Hampshire; Ph.D., 1960, Harvard University;
Associate Professor of Economics, Washington and Lee University.
I. Markham, Antitrust Trends and New Constraints, 41 HARV. Bus. Rgv. No. 3,
p. 84 (1963).
2. Id. at 85.
3. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
4. The term "regulated industries" will refer to those firms which are subject to
commission regulation or other direct control by public officials over entrepreneurial
decisions.
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I.
MARKET POWER AND CONCENTRATION

Measured by courtroom results the Celler-Kefauver Act has been
notably successful." Since passage of the amendment, 128 cases have
been brought by the two enforcement agencies and 71 have been
decided (see Appendix I). In these latter cases, complete divestiture was
obtained in 29 cases, partial divestiture in 23 cases, and 19 cases were
either dropped or decided against the government (see Appendix II).
The relevant test, however, is not the number of cases won, but
whether an economically meaningful standard has been developed to
separate desirable from undesirable mergers. Students of merger policy
are divided on this issue. On the one hand, some commentators generally support the present policy, while others feel that it is too
permissive. 0 On the other hand, others fear that current doctrines
hamper adjustments in the organization of industry necessary to achieve
efficiency. 7 Our position is that the standard applied up to, but not
including Brown Shoe v. United States' and United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 9 provided a meaningful method of distinguishing
between potentially harmful and harmless consolidations. Recent decisions, however, indicate a shift to a policy with a much weaker
economic rationale.
The revised section 7 forbids any merger where "the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend
to create a monopoly."'" The courts and the Federal Trade Commission have made it clear that they take seriously the supposed increase
in concentration which motivated the passage of the Celler-Kefauver
Act and that all mergers will receive suspicious scrutiny." In so doing
5. For a review of judicial decisions under the amendment, see BOCK, MERGERS
A GUIDE TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW (1962) ; Dirlam, The
Celler-Kefauver Act: A Review of Enforcement Policy, in ADMINISTERED PRICES:
A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY (1963); Phillips & Hall, Economic and Legal
Aspects of Merger Litigation, 1951-1962, 10 HOUSTON Bus. REv. 1 (1963).
6. Dirlam, The Celler-Kefauver Act: A Review of Enforcement Policy, in
AND MARKETS:

ADMINISTERED

PRICES:

A

COMPENDIUM

ON

PUBLIC

POLICY

108, 130-31

(1963);

Houghton, Mergers, Superconcentration, and the Public Interest, in ADMINISTERED
PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY 152-65 (1963); Heflebower, Corporate
Mergers: Policy and Economic Analysis, 77 Q.J. ECON. 537 (1963); Martin, The
Broze Shoe Case and the New Antimerger Policy, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 340, 356-58
(1963).
7. Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 AM. ECON. REv. 236 (May, 1961,
No. 2; separately paginated); von Kalinowski, Section 7 and Competitive Effects.
48 VA. L. REv. 827 (1962).
8. 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 1502 (1962).
9. 374 U.S. 321, 83 S.Ct. 1715 (1963).
10. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
11. See Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 651-74 (1961). There have been few statistical studies undertaken to indicate the effect of post-war mergers on concentration

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss2/3

2

WINTER

Hall and Phillips: Antimerger Criteria: Power, Concentration, Foreclosure and Size

1964]

ANTIMERGER

CRITERIA

a market power standard has been developed. Any merger which
increases the power of a firm in the relevant market is illegal. Therefore, the meaning of "market power" and "relevant market" must
be considered.
A.

Market Power

Consider market power first. The phrase itself came into antitrust jargon with the Sherman Act victories in the 1940's and early
1950's in such cases as Alcoa,' 2 American Tobacco," and Du Pont
(Cellophane)." These cases established that the essence of monopolization is the ability of a firm to control prices or other economic
variables.' 5 Yet, even under the "new" Sherman Act, market power
has never been the sole factor in determining legality; the manner in
which power was obtained and used have been the major considerations." The courts, in making an increase in market power sufficient
to strike down a merger regardlessof intent or performance, have thus
increased the significance of market power far beyond that which it
had prior to the Celler-Kefauver Act.'"
Judge Weinfeld's decision in United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp.'" is the source of the "new" antimerger doctrine. In his view:
There may be a substantial lessening of competition or tendency
to monopoly when a merger substantially increases concentration, eliminates a substantial factor in competition, eliminates a
substantial source of supply, or results in the establishment of
relationships between buyers and sellers which deprive their rivals
of a fair opportunity to compete. 9
Note what the Bethlehem test did not do. (1) It did not make
all mergers illegal; some "substantial" effect is needed. Further, it
and competition. See

ADELMAN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CURRE'NT WAVE OF

(Am. Management A. 114 Financial Management Series 82 (1957)).
12. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
13. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125 (1946).
14. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 76 S.Ct.
994 (1956).
MERGERS,

15.

KAYSEN

& TURNER,

ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

44-141 (1959).
16. Cole -. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Hughes Tool Co. v.
Ford, 114 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Okla. 1953); Hughes Tool Co. v. Cole, 113 F. Supp.
527 (W.D. Okla. 1953) ; Hughes Tool Co. v. Conaghan, 113 F. Supp. 519 (W.D.
Okla. 1953); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953).
17. Dirlam holds that even under the Celler-Kefauver Act, market power has not
been the sole test, but performance and intent also have played roles. As discussed
below, we believe that he has confused the measurement of power with its possible
justification. But even if his view is accepted, Dirlam points out that the stress in
section 7 litigation on power has been much greater than under the Sherman Act.
Dirlam, The Celler-Kefauver Act: A Review of Enforcement Policy, in ADMINISTERED
PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY 100-02, 131 (1963).

18. 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
19. Id. at 603.
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did not specify whether "substantial" is a quantitative or qualitative
term. (2) The test did not permit any justification of a merger which
might have a significant impact upon market structure. No "intent"
or "performance" defense was allowed. (3) The test did not base
illegality solely on the change in the number and size of firms; it
covered several aspects of the buyer-seller relationship.
All three points have been subject to judicial modification since
Bethlehem and will be discussed in turn.
1. The "Substantiality" of Mergers
It is frequently overlooked that only a small percentage of all
industrial mergers are challenged. From 1951 to 1962, the FTC had
knowledge of 5,848 acquisitions among manufacturing and mining
companies alone, yet only 476 of these acquisitions were challenged
under section 7.2o Thus, nearly ninety-two per cent of all industrial
mergers during this period were implicitly approved by the two enforcement agencies. Moreover, the courts have emphasized that only
"anticompetitive" mergers were proscribed by the Celler-Kefauver Act.
This position has economic justification, for a ban on all growth
by acquisition would involve significant social costs." Under certain
conditions, mergers can promote efficiency and competition. In an
industry in which demand is inelastic and either static or declining,
and in which the present firms have not obtained optimum size, mergers
may be the only way to obtain efficiency without loss of the social value
of the assets involved. In concentrated industries with high barriers
to entry, mergers also may be the only way in which the risk of entry
can be lowered sufficiently to make entry attractive, to change the existing inter-firm organization and, hopefully, to increase rivalistic behavior.
Conversely, in a growing economy with wide markets, few firms
will be limited by the extent of the market. 2 Such a situation makes
it relatively easy to advocate a "hard" posture towards mergers without concern for economic efficiency. A merger ban does not prevent
changes in scale and, cateris parabus, since it adds to capacity without
decreasing the number of decision making units, internal growth is
more likely to increase rivalistic behavior than is the same growth
23

through merger.

20. Phillips & Hall, Economic and Legal Aspects of Mergcr Litigation, 1951-1962,

10 HouSTON Bus. REv. 4 (1963).
21.

KAYSEN

&

TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON AcT 320-26 (1959).

127-36 (1959) ;MARTIN,

22. For empirical evidence relating to this point, see BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEw
COMPETITION 53-113 (1956).
23. KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
135 (1959) ; Sigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 50 AM. ECON. REv. 23 (1960).
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The courts and the FTC have used this line of reasoning on
occasion. More often, however, they have argued that Congress desired
to limit concentration because of the social advantages of a decentralized economy. Nevertheless, both congressional debates and judicial
decisions have asserted that some mergers may not only be permissible,
but socially desirable. In Brown Shoe, for instance, the Supreme Court
noted that a merger involving a failing firm or two firms too small
to compete in an industry dominated by giants would presumably be
legal.24 More recent cases have stressed the failing firm defense and
have merely touched on the possibility of a merger of small members
of an industry increasing competition.2 5 In any eyent, these possible
defenses remain dicta and have yet to be subjected to careful judicial
26
investigation.
Most mergers challenged have involved horizontal consolidations
where at least one firm was large both in absolute size and relative
to some market, as shown in Appendix III. The probability that a
horizontal merger involving such firms will increase market power
is high. Thus, they present an obvious target for attack. The relevant
issue, however, is whether antimerger policy should prevent only those
acquisitions which appear likely to increase a firm's ability to control
prices or other aspects of market power, or whether the ban on mergers
should be expanded. Dirlam, for one, advocates going beyond market
power by applying the Celler-Kefauver Act to "giantism. '2 7 Further,
what of mergers in areas where public policy has accepted some market
power as desirable or unavoidable, that is, the regulated industries?
We shall return to these issues later.
2. The Justification of Mergers
The essential feature of the "new" Clayton Act is that consolidations which increase market power are in effect per se illegal. The
See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 1502 (1962), where
the Court argued:
A company's history of expansion through mergers presents a different
economic picture than a history of expansion through unilateral growth. Internal
expansion is more likely to be the result of increased demand for the company's
products and is more likely to provide increased investment in plants, more jobs
and greater output. Conversely, expansion through merger is more likely to reduce
available consumer choice while providing no increase in industry capacity, jobs
or output. Id. at 345 n.72, 82 S.Ct. at 1534 n.72.
24. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 331, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1527
(1962).
25. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1746, n.46 (i963).
26. Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The Failing Company "Myth," 49 GEo.
L.J. 84-99 (1960) ; Comment, An Updating of the "Failing Company" Doctrine in the
Amended Section 7 Setting, 61 MICH. L. Rsv. 566 (1963).
27. Dirlam, The Celler-Kefauver Act: A Review of Enforcement Policy, in
ADMINISTERED PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY 104-06 (1963).
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treatment of mergers in United States v. Columbia Steel2 8 has been
reversed; the intent of a merger or the possible beneficial results of
a union are irrelevant. This point need not be belabored, but it should
be emphasized that the prohibition of a defense based on intent or
performance can be justified in either of two ways. One might hold
that few mergers which would increase market power also would be
likely to have a procompetitive impact and that a per se rule simply
shortens and simplifies the judicial process. Or, one might hold that
regardless of economic performance an unconcentrated market structure
is a social good.
Until PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank it was not absolutely certain which
of these two positions the courts held. Brown Shoe appeared to endorse enthusiastically the latter position, but contained a reference to
the possible relevance of "countervailing competitive, economic, or
social advantages. '2 9 Yet, such advantages are patently in conflict with
the main argument of the case that increases in market power are
illegal even if a price in the form of inefficiency has to be paid."'
PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank apparently removed all doubts by laying down
the rule that the only justification of an otherwise illegal structural
change is the "failing firm" defense."1
3. Concentration and Illegality
How are the effects of a merger on the market power of firms
to be determined? In most cases, the courts and the Commission have
examined a variety of factors including some or all of the following:
concentration, the market position of the firms, the effect of the elimination of a viable independent firm on competition, the history of
mergers, the conditions of entry, vertical integration, the role of small
business, and sources of price and non-price rivalry. 2 Concentration
has always held a dominant position among these factors, but most
decisions have considered more than just this aspect of competition.
To illustrate: the FTC's opinion in Pillsbury3 3 and the district
court's opinion in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank both contain arguments
that a broad examination of the entire structure of an industry is
necessary to evaluate the probable impact of a merger. In the latter,
Judge Clary quoted from Am. Crystal Sugar v. Cuban Am. Sugar Co. 4
28. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948).

29. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1528 (1962).
30. Dirlam, The Celler-Kefauver Act: A Review of Enforcement Policy, in
ADMINISTERED PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY 121 (1963).
31. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1746 n.46 (1963).

32. Phillips & Hall, Economic and Legal Aspects of Merger Litigation, 1951-1962.
10 HOUSTON Bus. REv. 35-45 (1963).
33. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960).
34. A.m. Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban Am. Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
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to the effect that the proper test was one of "qualitative substantiality"
and stated: "The 'qualitative substantiality' test, in contradistinction
to 'quantitative substantiality,' requires an appraisal of all the relevant
factors, not merely a determination of the aggregate share of the
market. . ..

""

He went on to propose the following questions:

(1) How much of an increase in concentration will be brought
about by the merger? (2) Will the increase in concentration
give the merged bank the power to control the price and supply
of banking services? (3) Will the merger eliminate a substantial
competitor from the market? (4) What is the competitive situation among commercial banks in the relevant market today?
(5) What will probably be the competitive situation after the
merger? (6) What is the probability of a new commercial bank
coming into existence in the four-county area? (7) What is the
history of defendants with respect to prior mergers?6
This series of tests (but not the answers) put the district court's
approach in the mainstream of previous section 7 decisions. Even in
Brown Shoe, where concentration was the prime interest, the Supreme
Court examined most of these factors. But the Supreme Court broke
new ground in its PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank decision when all of these
factors were reduced to one: concentration. Mr. Justice Brennan held:
. . . intense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate
proof of market structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think that a merger which
produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the
relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence
of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have
such anticompetitive effects. See United States v. Koppers Co.,
202 F. Supp. 437 (D.C.W.D. Pa. 1962)."
In short, "quantitative substantiality" (in Judge Clary's sense) is the
legal test.
Mr. Justice Brennan did not specify a precise percentage as the
"magic number." He noted the tests proposed by Kaysen and Turner,
Stigler, Markham and Bok, and pointed out that the thirty per cent of
35. United
Pa. 1962).
36. Ibid.

States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 365 (E.D.

37. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1741 (1963).

38. "Quantitative substantiality" is a phrase taken from the doctrine developed
for § 3 of the Clayton Act. Judge Clary used the term with reference to percentages,
while in § 3 cases it refers to absolute amounts. Mr. Justice Brennan, in Philadclphia
Nat'l Bank, also used the term in Judge Clary's sense.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1964

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1964], Art. 3
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9: p. 211

the market which would be controlled by the merged bank would fail
each test. 9 He concluded: "Without attempting to specify the smallest
market share which would still be considered to threaten undue concentration, we are clear that 30% presents that threat."40
The rule that concentration alone is sufficent to declare a merger
illegal should be distinguished from the rule that only the impact on
the structure of markets is relevant. Some commentators have equated
the two propositions and have asserted that a consideration of any
features of a market--other than concentration--opens the door to an
intent or performance test.4 Such an argument confuses measurement
and justification. The issue is whether concentration is an adequate
proxy for all the determinants of competitive behavior. If it were, the
tasks of economists would be much simpler, but the history of industrial
organization studies indicates that it is not. 42 More importantly, the
vagueness of the concept of a market in merger law leaves concentration data with little meaning. The Philadelphia Nat'l Bank decision,
which in effect makes any significant increase in "concentration" illegal,
destroys the basic foundation of a strict merger policy. No longer is
concentration a means of determining whether firms are likely to have
the ability to control variables which should be determined outside
the firm; relative size of firms now becomes an evil in itself.
B.

Relevant Markets

The determination of the "relevant market" has always been the
intellectual Achilles' heel of section 7 doctrine. Imprecision was at
least tolerable as long as concentration data was merely one measure
of the impact of a merger. Despite the outcrys of economists and
lawyers over the vagueness of market definition doctrine, it could be
assumed that serious measurement errors would be revealed by examination of other structural features. But if concentration should become
the sole consideration, the state of market definition doctrine will be
crucial both for trial tactics and the intellectual foundation of antimerger policy.
39. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1742, n.41 (1963).
40. Ibid. The authors are not implying that the Supreme Court's Brown Shoe
and Philadelphia Nat'l Bank decisions are inconsistent. The market structures and

market shares in each case were quite different. The concern is with the growing

emphasis on concentration data in determining market power.
41. Dirlam, The Celler-Kefauver Act: A Review of Enforcement Policy, in
AD)MtINISTERED PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY 110-12 (1963).
42. Miller, Measures of Monopoly Power and Concentration: Their Economic
Sinificance, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 134-35 (1955) ; NELSON,
CONCENTRATION IN THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES Or THE UNITED STATES 3-4
(1962) ; Carson & Horovitz, Concentration Ratios and Competition, 1 NAT. BANKING
1",. 105-10 (1963).
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It might seem that emphasis on concentration data would lead to
more judicial effort to perfect and specify precise market definition
techniques. In fact, it is likely that exactly the opposite will take place.
In every case there are "special" or "peculiar" conditions and, therefore, some "degrees of freedom" are necessary to allow courts to
perform their function. As the number of variables examined declines,
the maintenance of flexibility with respect to the specification of the
market gains judicial appeal. It is probable that many of the considerations formerly considered under the rubric of "market power"
now will be subsumed under the heading of "market definition."
The strategy of the participants in a trial, nevertheless, will remain
unchanged. On the one hand, the defense either will attempt to obtain
a definition of the market which establishes such narrow boundaries
that the consolidating firms will be in separate markets, or will propose
a relevant market so broad that the increase in concentration will be
de mintimis. The government, on the other hand, will attempt to
obtain a "middle-sized" market so that the resulting concentration
will fail to pass the test. Thus, the court will be in a position to pick
and choose among several options. The Brown Shoe and Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank decisions have established that there are markets-within-43
markets and that the narrowest reasonable market is the relevant one.
That this situation is an intellectual monstrosity does not prevent it
from being judicially useful by providing almost unlimited authority to
the courts in choosing a market.
If a market is to be determined on economic grounds, then it is
the unit which encompasses the supply and demand function." To
assert that there are markets-within-markets avoids, rather than solves,
the problem of specifying what the demand and supply relationships
are between the merging firms. Of course, one can deny the validity
of supply and demand functions in small number markets and move
to a cross-elasticity of demand procedure. While cross-elasticities
are impossible to estimate empirically, a reasonable approximation
might be an "overlap" type of analysis such as has been proposed by
43.
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product
itself and substitutes for it. However, within the broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes. . . . The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by
examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and
uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to
price changes and specialized vendors. (Footnotes and citation omitted.) Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325-26, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1523-24 (1962).
44. Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 AM. EcoN. Rtv. 236 (May. 1961,
No. 2; separately paginated). See also Mann'& Lewyn, The Relevant Market Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two New Cases-Two Different Views, 47 VA. L.
Rev. 1014 (1961); MASSZL, COMP4TITION AND MONOpOY 271-74 (1962).
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Mrs. Keyes.4 5 An investigation of the number of common customers
supplied by the merging firms would be required. Yet, this approach
also begs the question for, among other reasons, the issue remains
of specifying how much overlap is "too much."4
While the markets-within-markets concept has little economic
justification, it does provide the necessary flexibility so that the courts
can consider many of the factors previously examined under the
"qualitative substantiality" test of market power. The general rule
is that the market selected should be the smallest which is reasonable.
But unless the courts are willing to declare any merger illegal where
one customer might be a potential buyer from either firm, the issue
of how small is the smallest reasonable market will always have to be
decided. Therefore, the supposed precision, ease, and logic of the
concentration test of legality turn out to be illusionary.
II.
MARKET

POWER, FORECLOSURE, AND SIZE

Few horizontal mergers involving large industrial firms are likely
to be the subject of FTC or court proceedings in the near future. The
market power standard and the current role of concentration data
mean that most mergers involving firms with a substantial share of
any recognizable market will be stopped in the offices of corporate
counsel.4 7 The significant cases in the next decade will involve nonhorizontal acquisitions in the unregulated sector and mergers in the

regulated sector.48
45. Keyes, The Bethlehem-Youngstown Case and the Market-Share Criterion,
51 Am. EcoN. Rev. 643 (1961). One might object that a merger of two firms with
identical customers, but insignificant market shares would pose no competitive issue.
If the product were homogeneous, this is correct; product differentiation lessens the
relevance of the objection. In any event, from a public policy standpoint, such mergers
are unimportant regardless of the criterion of legality simply because budgetary
constraints on the enforcement agencies mean they are unlikely to be challenged. See
Phillips & Hall, Economic and Legal Aspects of Merger Litigation, 1951-1962,
10 HousToN Bus. REv. 62-65 (1963).
46. The Supreme Court is conscious of this problem as evidenced by the
following quote:
We recognize that the area in which appellees have their offices does not
delineate with perfect accuracy an appropriate "section of the country" in which
to appraise the effect of the merger upon competition. Large borrowers and
large depositors, the record shows, may find it practical to do a large part of
their banking business outside their home community; very small borrowers and
depositors may, as a practical matter, be confined to bank offices in their immediate
neighborhood; and customers of intermediate size, it would appear, deal with
banks within an area intermediate between these extremes. United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1739-40 (1963).
47. Rowe, Mergers and the Law: New Directions for the Sixties, 47 A.B.A.J.
1074. 1077 (1961).
48. As Appendix III shows, about three-quarters of all merger cases to date have
involved horizontal acquisitions. Only thirty-two cases have had vertical or conglomerate features, and only two joint ventures have been challenged. Moreover, all
but twenty-two cases have involved the traditional antitrust areas of manufacturing,
mining, and distribution. The regulated industries, such as utilities, transportation,
and finance, have been the subject of only ten suits.
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Vertical Mergers

Consider vertical mergers first. Vertical integration by itself cannot create market power.4 9 It can extend market power from one
industry to another, and it may re-enforce monopoly positions by
increasing the size of investment needed for effective entry or providing
leverage ability.5" To demonstrate such potential results is obviously
harder than to show the size effects of a vertical acquisition. Further,
the conditions necessary for vertical integration to increase market
power make it unlikely that the Bethlehem tests, for instance, would
result in striking down many mergers. Nor is the approach of
PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank likely to reach many vertical mergers, for how
is concentration to be measured across market divisions ?51
The courts have avoided these issues by switching from a market
power criterion to a "market foreclosure" test.2 The standards of
section 3 of the Clayton Act have been transferred to section 7." The
rule is that any vertical merger which forecloses a "substantial" customer or supplier is illegal.54 United States v. E. I. duPont Nemours
& Co.55 can be cited as the forerunner of this approach, but as few
mergers involve such giants, Brown Shoe is more relevant. The
vertical aspects of this case involved a combination of four per cent
of the shoe manufacturing industry with one and one-half per cent of
the retail shoe market. The merger was declared illegal on the basis
that small independent manufacturers would be deprived of access to
Kinney's business.56
Adelman interpretated Brown Shoe as holding that a competitive
advantage gained through any cost savings as a result of vertical
49. DIRLAM & KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS or ANTITRUST POLICY 146-50 (1954); KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 132 (1959) ; Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 AM.
ECON. Rzv. 236, 239 (May, 1961, No. 2; separately paginated).
50. KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

132 (1959).
51. In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court stated that while market share is the
"primary index" of market power, "only a further examination of the particular
market-its structure, history and probable future-can provide the appropriate
setting for judging the probable anti-competitive effect of the merger." 370 U.S. 294,
322 n.38, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1522 n.38 (1962). Especially is this true in vertical integration cases, since market shares "will seldom be determinative" and, unless either very
large or very small, concentration "cannot itself be decisive." Id. at 328, 82 S.Ct.
at 1525.
52. Supporters of a market foreclosure test include Dirlam, The Celler-Kefauver
Act: A Review of Enforcement Policy, in ADMINISTERED PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON
PUBLIC POLICY 125 (1963); KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 132-33 (1959) ; Martin, The Brown Shoe Case and the New

Antimerger Policy, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 353 (1963).
53. Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 S.Ct. 1051 (1949).
54. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1525 (1962).
55. 353 U.S. 586, 77 S.Ct. 872 (1957).
56. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-34, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1525-29
(1962).
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integration is illegal.5 7 Dirlam disagreed, asserting that the cost savings
aspects of the merger were of little importance in either the district
court or Supreme Court decisions. He argued that:
The Brown Shoe opinions . . . cannot be cited to show that

economics of integration are illegal. Foreclosures from a substantial market as a consequence of a vertical acquisition serves to
demonstrate illegality; this is the holding of Brown Shoe. The
doctrine may be "protectionist" in the sense that it protects the
right of small manufacturers to compete for Kinney's business;
it scarcely seems to exclude low-cost producers from a market. '
Dirlam's distinction between "protection" of a market and "protection" from low cost producers is unpersuasive. Shoe manufacturing
and shoe retailing are both highly competitive, and the ability of a
vertical merger to extend or enhance monopoly in such market structures is practically nil. Any merger involves foreclosure in the trivial
sense that there is one less buyer or seller. But, if there is competition.
the only way that a buyer would find himself unable to find a seller,
or conversely, a seller a buyer, is if integration so lessened the costs
of production and distribution that a general movement throughout
the industry to vertical integration resulted. Then, and only then.
would a non-integrated firm be unable to find another dealer. There-

fore, the protection of the share of the market represented by Kinney's
purchases amounts to protecting the high cost (non-integrated) firm
from the advantages accruing to an integrated producer.
The confusion about the protectionist aspects of the current policy
towards vertical mergers stems partly from confusion about the
rationale for a strict antimerger policy. Unlike a horizontal merger,
a vertical acquisition cannot create market power. Further, the customary vertical distinctions between "industries" are constantly fluctuating in a dynamic economy. The divisions between industries are the
result of the differences between the cost of intra-firm transfers and
market transactions.5 9 The constant concern of management with
"make or buy" decisions indicates the dynamic character of this relationship. Thus, a strict antimerger policy is likely to conflict more
with efficiency goals when applied to vertical mergers than when applied
to horizontal acquisitions.
57. Adelman: The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 AM. EcON. REv. 236, 240-41

(May. 1961, No. 2; separately paginated). See also Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. Rzv. 27 (1949) ; Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract.
and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 21-22 (1959).
58. Dirlam, The Celler-Kefauver Act: A Review of Enforcement Policy, in
A COMPENDIUM oN" PUBLIC POLICY 125 (1963). See also Rahl.
Current Antitrust Developments in the Merger Field, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 493, 505-15
(1963).
59. Coase, The Nature of the Firin, ECONOMICA 389 (1937) ; Adelman, Concept
and Statistical Measurement of Vertical Integration, in BuSINeSS CONCENTRATIOX
AND PRICE POLICY 281-321 (1955).
ADMINISTERED PRICES:
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It might be argued that, as with horizontal mergers, efficiency
considerations should be irrelevant. Yet, note that in a merger such
as the proposed Brown-Kinney union, both market power and concentration would have remained unchanged (despite the Court's lengthy
attempt to envision an increase in concentration from the consolidation).,0 To the extent that there were cost savings to be realized, the
sole gain from allowing only internal expansion was the prevention of
"foreclosure." The stress on the supposed advantages of protecting
the markets of small business, therefore, covers up the real effect of
the current treatment of vertical mergers. Unlike the case for horizontal
mergers, where absolute size is irrelevant and where only the size of the
firm in relation to the market is examined, the market foreclosure test
makes relative size unimportant and absolute size the deciding factor.
B.

Conglomerate Mergers

Conglomerate mergers are another area certain to receive considerable attention from antitrust authorities in future years. However,
the criteria by which such mergers can be challenged under section 7
are elusive. A truly conglomerate merger is by definition one in which
the firms share no common supply or demand curves. Since such a
merger could have no effect on competition, concentration, or foreclosure, any objection would have to center on absolute size."' The
traditional case against conglomerate firms is that their size gives them
the power to inflict competitive injury upon rivals.6 2 Yet, absolute
size cannot be equated with either market power or market control.
As Adelman has argued:
In the antitrust dictionary, "powerful" has no necessary connection with monopoly power or market control or even market
share. It means "vast financial reserves," "overwhelming economic
60. This statement is subject to the qualification that Brown owned a few retail
outlets and Kinney is the country's twelfth largest shoe manufacturer. The increase
in concentration, however, would have been insignificant.
61.
A conglomerate merger does not result in the elimination of a competitor
but merely substitutes the competition of the acquiring company for that of the
acquired company in the lines of commerce in which the acquired company was
formerly engaged. Thus, such a merger does not in itself result in any increase in
industry or product market concentration and the shares of the acquiring and
acquired companies in their respective product markets are the same as they
were before. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 786
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
62. Adams defines conglomerate power as follows: "This means that a firm's operations are so widely diversified that its survival no longer depends on success in any
given product market or any given geographical area. Its absolute size, its sheer
bigness, is so impressive that it can discipline or destroy its more specialized competitors." Quoted in 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 304 (1963). See also Bicks, Conglomerates
Mid Diversification Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 175
(1956); Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672
(1958) ; Ed wards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BusINEss 'CoNCENTRATTON AND PRICE PoLicy 331 (1955) ; Stocking, Comment, Id. at 352.
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strength," "colossal corporate resources," or some other pompous
polysyllabic combination meaning one four-letter word: size. And
"drastic competitive injury" means simply loss of business. So
a merger is illegal if (1) it involves a big company and (2) small
business concerns afterward lose sales. Competition-pure, workable, effective, or whatever-has vanished, replaced by protectionism. Some small companies might have been losing business
because they were inefficient or ill-adapted to new market conditions. Moreover, where firms are numerous, many must by chance
alone be in difficulties as of any one moment. To blame their
troubles, real or fancied, on the acquisition by the
large company
63
is clearly fallacious, post hoc ergo propter hoc.
The debate over absolute size is relevant for truly conglomerate
mergers, but most mergers classified as conglomerate involve the
union of two companies whose products are physically different or
which perform different functions, yet which are related in some
manner due to common demand or supply elements (the use of idle
capacity, better utilization of salesmen, the investment of surplus capital
funds). There is little consensus among the enforcement agencies and
the courts about the appropriate standards for such quasi-conglomerate
mergers. In two complaints it was charged that the acquiring firms'
financial resources would enable, or had enabled, the companies to
increase the acquired firms' market shares at the expense of smaller
producers.64 A market foreclosure test has been used in three cases.
In Consolidated Foods, the FTC held that Consolidated's acquisition
of Gentry would create an anticompetitive effect inherent in the corporate structure, namely, reciprocity.6 5 In United States v. Continental
Cai,66 the district court rejected this criterion. Market foreclosure was
cited in the complaint issued against General Dynamics.6
In two
other complaints, involving General Motors, both absolute size and
market foreclosure were alleged.68
63. Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 Am. EcoN. REv. 236, 243 (May.
1961, No. 2; separately paginated).
64. The Procter & Gamble Co., F.T.C. Docket 6901, complaint filed September 30,
1957; General Foods Corp., 1963 TRADE REG. Rim (Trade Cas.)
16612.
65. By purchasing Gentry, Consolidated would be able to "reap a profit from sales
in one product area, dehydrated onion and garlic, on the sheer strength of its buying
power in other markets and not on the basis of a better product or price." Consolidated
Foods Corp., F.T.C. Docket 7000, 1962 TRADE Rer. REp. (Trade Cas.) 1 16182 at
20973. See Donnem, The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity, 8 ANTITRUST BULL.
283 (1963).
66. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
appeal docketed, 32 U.S.L. WEE'K 3078 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1963) (No. 367).
67. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 62 Civ. 3686, complaint filed on
November 8, 1962.
68. United States v. General Motors Corp. (Euclid Road Machinery), complaint
filed October 16, 1959; United States v. General Motors Corp. (locomotive manufacturing), Civ. 63C80, complaint filed January 14, 1963. United States v. FMC Corp.
was voluntarily dismissed by the government on October 23, 1963. Scott Paper
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The FTC used a different approach in deciding the Procter &
Gam ble 9 case. The acquisition was regarded as a "product extension"
merger; the criterion was the same as for horizontal acquisitions.
Thus, while Procter & Gamble did not produce a liquid bleach prior
to its acquisition of Clorox, it distributed many household items with
marketing characteristics similar to bleach. The crux of the decision,
as the Commission emphasized, concerned the advantages accruing to
Procter & Gamble from integrating the marketing of Clorox with its
other products. The decision was that the economies resulting from
the merger were not due to increased social efficiency, but were due
to the impact of the acquisition on the structure of the market. The
Commission found, among other things, that the merger would change
the nature of advertising and, therefore, would raise the barriers to
entry into the liquid bleach industry.
Some might quarrel with the Commission's analysis of advertising. It is clear, however, that the decision centered on the heart
of the matter, that is, the impact of the merger on market power.
Moreover, this approach should be applied to all quasi-conglomerate
mergers. To illustrate: the issue in Continental Can is neither absolute
size nor market foreclosure. The relevant question is the degree to
which combining two substitute products will increase the market
power of the resulting firm. The point is that for quasi-conglomerate
mergers the criterion should be market power-the same as used in
horizontal acquisitions. To treat such mergers in any other fashion
would severely limit the usefulness of section 7 by turning it into a
weapon for protecting inefficient competitors.
C. Joint Ventures
A third area which remains to be explored is joint ventures. Only
two such mergers have been challenged: United States v. Cities Service
Co.,"0 which was terminated by consent decree, and United States v.
Penn-Olin Chemical Co.," which was held by a district court not to
violate section 7. In the latter case, the government charged that
involved both conglomerate and vertical acquisitions. Scott Paper Co., 57 F.T.C. 1415
(1960). The latter case was remanded to the FTC for additional market share
evidence, 301 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962). In Foremost Dairies, Inc., 1962 TRADE RG.
REP. (Trade Cas.)
15877, at 20676-86, a distinction was made between horizontal,
vertical, conglomerate, and market extension mergers. The latter was defined "as the
acquisition of a corporation engaged in the dairy business but in a geographical
location where respondent was not so engaged prior to the acquisition." Such a merger
should be "treated in the same manner as the conglomerates and . . . the same tests
must be applied to determine whether they violate Section 7."
69. The Procter & Gamble Co., 1963 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.)
16673
at 21558.
70. 1963 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) 1 70799.
71. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
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formation of Penn-Olin by the Olin Mathieson and the Pennsalt
Chemicals corporations had the probability of reducing potential competition between the two parties in the production of sodium chlorate
and actual competition in the production of non-chlorates.
With respect to sodium chlorate, the government contended that
both companies could have competed with each other in the production
of the product and that the antitrust laws require the two companies
to meet competitive challenges "on individual terms or not at all. They
may compete or not as they please. But the option to compete or
combine is forbidden." 7 2 Judge Steel found this position "novel and
far reaching,"7 but rejected it nonetheless, holding that there was no
evidence that in the absence of the joint venture the two companies
would have built individual plants in the relevant market. Nor are
joint ventures illegal per se. And, even though Penn-Olin might gain
some competitive advantages through reciprocal agreements, the court
could find no evidence that the joint venture would ultimately dominate
the sodium chlorate market.
With respect to non-chlorates, a slightly different situation was
presented. Both Olin and Pennsalt produce and sell a number of nonchlorates in direct competition with each other. The government
argued that the two companies would have the opportunity to make
anticompetitive agreements when they met to handle the affairs of
the joint venture. Judge Steel acknowledged this possibility, but
refused "to equate opportunity for wrongdoing with likelihood of
74
its occurrence .
Penn-Olin seems to say that when joint ventures are at issue,
some showing of market power is required. Like Continental Can, but
unlike Consolidated Foods, this decision appears to reject the market
foreclosure test for non-horizontal mergers and to adopt the stricter
tests applied to horizontal acquisitions.
D.

The Regulated Industries

Mergers of firms regulated by public authority present another
area where the relevance of current doctrine is an issue. Applying the
Celler-Kefauver Act to such mergers raises two problems: the coverage of the act and the criterion for legal behavior. As to the first, the
courts have made it clear that any exemption is to be narrowly construed. This conclusion is the import of United States v. Maryland &
72. Id. at 123-24 n.16.
73. Id. at 123.
74. Id. at 134. Common country club membership, in the author's opinion, would
seem an adequate substitute for the formation of a joint venture to fix prices.
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Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n,

United States v. E1 Paso Natural

8

Gas," and the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case. Indeed, the decision in
the latter case construed the "exemption" so narrowly that Mr. Justice
Harlan's dissent began: "I suspect that no one will be more surprised
than the Government to find that the Clayton Act has carried the day
for its case in this Court.""
The Supreme Court's Philadelphia Nat'l Bank decision also
brushed aside the regulated aspects of banking with the statement that:
Concededly, PNB and Girard are healthy and strong; they are
not undercapitalized or overloaned; they have no management
problems; the Philadelphia area is not overbanked; runious competition is not in the offing. Section 7 does not mandate cutthroat
competition in the banking industry, and does not exclude defenses
based on dangers to liquidity or solvency, if to avert them a merger
is necessary. It does require, however, that the forces of competition be allowed to operate within the broad framework of governmental regulation of the industry. The fact that banking is a
highly regulated industry critical to the Nation's welfare
makes
78
the play of competition not less important but more so.
With this view, it was easy for the Court to hold that the case
presented only a "straightforward problem of application" of the Brown
Shoe doctrine to the particular facts.79 As noted before, however,
Brown Shoe was extended, for concentration became the sole test of
market power. Thus concentration is the heart of the problem. However, is the significance of increases in concentration necessarily the
same in regulated and nonregulated industries?
To the extent that regulation is economically motivated, it
represents a judgment either that antitrust goals should be subordinated to other goals in a given industry, or that antitrust goals are
better achieved by direct control over managerial decisions.8 0 The
mere existence of regulation results in the development of a relationship among the firms, and between the firms and the regulating agency,
such that firm behavior and the influence of the industry's structure on
that behavior is often different from competitive industries. The implication should not be drawn that the existence of regulation properly
removes firms from all antitrust liability. Far from it, there has been
75. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp.
799 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458, 80 S.Ct. 847 (1960).
76. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1962 TRADE CAs. 70571 (D. Utah
1962), appeal docketed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3306 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1963) (No. 944, 1962
Term; renumbered No.94, 1963 Term).

77. 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1746 (1963).
78. Ibid.
79. Id. at 1737.
80. KAYSEN & TURNER,

ANTITRUST

POLICY: AN

ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

41 (1959).
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too little concern with applying antitrust law to regulated firms. The
point is that regulation precludes direct application of the doctrines
developed for non-regulated industries.
Banking, because of PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank and several pending
bank merger suits,"' provides an apt illustration. The clearing house
and correspondent bank relationships, the control over interest rates
paid on deposits, the control of the money supply, these, and many other
complex interrelationships fostered to achieve the monetary goals of
a stable payments mechanism with full employment and growth, lead
to a relationship between the structure of banking markets and the
behavior of banks which is different from that presupposed by the
antitrust laws.82 A deconcentrated market composed of small banks
is not necessarily more competitive in behavior or results than a concentrated one. Nor is it clear that maximizing rivalry is the most
desirable social policy in banking; at least there is a traditional view
83
that it is not.
Admittedly, Mr. Justice Brennan was aware of these considerations, as shown by the passage quoted above. He also included in a
footnote a dictum that the social seriousness of bank failure might
mean that the "failing firm" defense of International Shoe v. FTC
is more important for bank mergers.8 4 If one thinks about this dictum,
however, it becomes apparent that it violates the basic logic of the
Brown Shoe rule which was supposedly applied: the rule that unconcentrated market structures are desirable regardless of performance.
The dictum points out that performance is the key test of mergers in
the regulated industries. Therefore, by applying the concentration test
to industries where a performance test is more relevant, the courts
face a dilemma. If they ignore everything but concentration, they
ignore the single most important aspect of the regulated industriesthe regulation itself. If they examine performance in the regulated
industries, then future cases will not represent a "straightforward"
81. United States v. Bank Stock Corp., Civ. No. 61-C-54; United States v. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co., Civ.-No. 61-C-1441; United States v. Manufac-

turers Trust Co., Civ. No. 61-C-3194; United States v. The Valley Nat'l Bank, Civ.
No. 4550 Phx.; United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, Civ. No. 41808. One
bank merger case is on appeal to the Supreme Court under § 1 of the Sherman Act;
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 208 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Ky. 1962),

appeal docketed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3172 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1962) (No. 590, 1962 Term;
renumbered No. 36, 1963 Term).
82. MEYER, PECK, ST4NASON & ZWICK, THE ECONOMICS oF COMPETITION IN THE
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES (1959); PHILLIPS, MARKET STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION
AND RERVORMANCE (1962) ; Abramson, Private Competition and Public Regulation,
1 NAT. BANKING REV. 101-05 (1963) ; see also Note, Regulated Industries and the
Antitrust Laws: Substantive and Procedural Coordination, 58 COLUM. L. REv.
673 (1958).
83. A practical result of this view is that not one bank failed in 1962.
84. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1746, n.46 (1963),
citing International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 299-303, 50 S.Ct. 89, 91-93 (1929).
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application of previous doctrine, but will require the development of
a new set of standards.8 5
The latter avenue should be the route chosen. Other things being
equal, the public interest is best served if expansion in all industries
occurs by internal growth. But in the regulated industries, there is a
high probability that other things are not equal. The mere existence of
regulation would seem to require, at a minimum, an examination of the
degree to which maximizing the number of decision-making units in a
regulated industry assists the achievement of desired performance goals.
Ill.
CONCLUSION

Thirteen years of Celler-Kefauver Act litigation has resulted in
the development of a strict policy towards horizontal acquisitions. Any
consolidation which is likely to lead to the creation of, or to an increase
in, market power will be declared illegal. Such a ban on horizontal
mergers conflicts with the attainment of efficiency only if there are
substantial economies of scale and considerable cost disadvantages to
being less than optimum size. Given the structure of most industries,
it is doubtful that economies of scale pose any substantial problem to
restructuring industries by internal growth. Moreover, the importance
of past mergers in creating the market situations which pose antitrust
problems today suggests that should error be made, it should be in the
direction of more rather than less restriction on external growth. 6
The growing emphasis upon concentration data in horizontal
cases, however, is objectionable. Concentration and competition cannot
be regarded as mirror images; such an equation is empirically dubious.
Further, the current state of the art of market definition means that
the subjectivity and arbitrariness of merger standards are significantly
increased. Much of the appeal of a market power standard disappears
when concentration is regarded as synonymous with the ability to
control variables which should be exogenous to the firm.
Few important horizontal mergers are likely to reach the courts in
the near future. The relevant question currently posed for antimerger
policy concerns the standards developed to date for judging the legality
of nonhorizontal mergers and mergers among regulated firms.
85. We are not implying that the merger of Philadelphia National Bank and
Girard Trust should have been approved. This issue is beyond the scope of this
present paper. Our point is that the test which was used by the Supreme Court is not
useful for the regulated industries.
86. BUTTERS, LINTNER & CARY, EFFECTS op TAXATION: CORPORATE MERGERS
(1951) ; WESTON, THE ROLE OP MERGERS IN THE GRO\VTH Or LARGE FIRMS (1953);
Markham, Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICy 141-82 (1955).
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For vertical and conglomerate mergers, as well as joint ventures,
the issue is whether a market foreclosure or absolute size test will
replace the market power criterion. Should this occur, a not unlikely
eventuality, merger policy will conflict with the goal of efficiency much
more in the future than in the past. The adoption of either test would
do what the courts have insisted they would not do-use the CellerKefauver Act to protect competitors rather than competition.
For mergers of regulated firms, the issue is whether they will be
treated as though they involved nonregulated companies. If they are,
and this would appear to be the conclusion of PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank,
then antimerger policy will further complicate the almost insurmountable task of bringing economic rationality to bear on regulatory policy.
The analysis of this article indicates that economists have not yet
developed clear-cut and conclusive criteria by which the courts can
determine the legality of challenged mergers.8 7 Perhaps such criteria
can never be developed. But the ends cannot justify the means; proper
criteria are just as important as the results of court decisions. It is,
after all, the doctrine applied and not the results which determine the
future course of antimerger policy. For what consolidation it may
bring, the foregoing analysis also demonstrates that students of antimerger policy need not fear technological unemployment.
87. As Heflebower puts it: "Faced with inconclusive theory and paltry evidence
by which to predict the effects of a merger, the courts must decide which way to err."
Corporate Mergers: Policy and Economic Analysis, 77 Q.J. EcoN. 538 (1963).

However, the authors disagree with Bok's conclusion: "There is undoubtedly a point
in human understanding where information can be said to bear upon a situation without

being understood well enough to assist in predicting the course of future events. We
have argued that much of the relevant economic theory has reached this point and

that to use such doctrine in attempting elaborate predictions under section 7 will cause

confusion rather than enlightenment." Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. Rgv. 349 (1960).
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APPENDIX I
STATUS OF MERGER LITIGATION

(January 1, 1951-February 1, 1964)
Cases Initiated By
Justice
Department
FTC

Total
Cases

Cases Filed ..................................
Cases Terminated:
Consent Order or Decree .................
Commission' or Court Decision .............
Voluntary Withdrawal ....................

52

76

128

17
14
1

21
11
7

38
25
8

Total ............................

32

39

71

20b

37,

57

Cases Pending (February 1, 1964) ..............

Only full Commission decisions are considered here. Three Commission decisions
were subsequently upheld by the courts (Crown Zellerbach, Reynolds Metals, and
Spalding).
Includes two Commission decisions (Foremost Dairies and Pillsbury Mills) which
have been appealed to the courts, and two decisions (Erie Sand and Scott Paper)
which have been remanded to the Commission.
0 Includes four cases
(Aluminum Co. of America-Rome Cable, Continental CanHazel-Atlas, El Paso Natural Gas, and Penn-Olin Chemical) which have been
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Source: TRAD REG. REP., 1951-1964.
APPENDIX II
RESULTS OF MERGER LITIGATION

(January 1,1951-February 1,1964)
Cases Initiated By
Justice
Department
FTC

Total
Cases

Cases Terminated:
Complete Divestiture ......................
Partial Divestiture ........................
Divestiture Denied . ......................

11
12
9

18
11
10

29"
23

Total ............................

32

39

71

19 d

* Includes cases voluntarily dismissed.
b FTC cases: American Cement, Automatic Canteen, Consolidated Foods, Crown
Zellerbach, Gulf Oil, High Voltage, Leslie Salt, National Sugar, Procter & Gamble,
Reynolds Metals, Spalding; Justice Department cases: American Radiator,AnheuserBusch (Miami Brewery), Bethlehem, Brown Shoe, Calumet Nat. Bank, Cities
Service, Diebold, FMC, Gamble-Skogmo, Kaiser Aluminum (Kawneer), Koppers,
Maryland & Virginia Milk, Minute Maid, Parents Magazine, Philadelphia Nat.
Bank, Republic Corp., Standard Oil (Ohio), Stauffer Chemical.
0 FTC cases:
Continental Baking, Diamond Crystal Salt, Farm Journal, Hooker
Chemical, Luria Bros., Martin-Marietta,Minnesota Mining, National Dairy, Scovill
Mfg., Simpson Timber, Union Carbide, Vendo; Justice Department cases: Firstamerica, General Shoe, Hertz, Hilton,Lucky Lager Brewing, Maremont Automotive,
National Alfalfa, Nationbal Homes, Owens-Illinois Glass, Ryder System, Sutburban
Gas.
d FTC cases: Brillo Mfg., Crane, Dresser, International Paper, Kaiser Industries,
Kaiser Steel, National Lead, Union Bag & Paper, Warner; Justice Department
cases: Bliss & Laughlin, Columbia Pictures, Cunningham Drug, General Cable,
Jerrold, Lever Bros., Ling-Temco, MCA, Schenley, United Artists.
Source: TRADE REG. REP., 1951-1964.
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APPENDIX III
ANTIMERGMR CASES CLASSIFI1D BY TYPE oF MERGER, SIZE OF
ACQUIRING FIRM, AND MARKET SHARZ
ACCORDING TO COMPLAINT

(January 1, 1951-February 1, 1964)
Number

Total

1. Type of Acquisition
Horizontal ........................................
V ertical ..........................................
Horizontal and Vertical ............................
Conglomerate ...................................
Joint V enture .....................................
Vertical and Conglomerate .........................

94
12
11
8
2
1

Total .........................
1I.

Siz-e of Acquiring Company by Assets
A. Industrial
100 largest ................................
101-200 largest ............................
201-300 largest ............................
301-400 largest ............................
401-500 largest ............................
Below 500 largest ..........................
Unclassified ..............................
Total .........................
B.

Merchandising
25 largest .................................
26-50 largest .............................
Below 50 largest ...........................
Total .........................

C.

D.

128

32
18
10
5
4
19
4
92
2
3
6
11

Commercial Banking
25 largest .................................
Below 25 largest ...........................

4
1

Total .........................

5

Not Classified ................................

20

Grand Total ......

111.

Standing of Acquiring Firm in
Market According to Complaint
F irst .............................................
Second ...........................................
T hird ............................................
Fourth ...........................................
F ifth .............................................
N inth ............................................
Standing not given ................................
"Dominate" .. ......................
4
"Among largest" . ..................
25
"Major producer" ...................
10
No mention of standing ............
1
Total .........................

128

54
18
8
1
4
3
40

128

Source: Complaints issued by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, January 1, 1951-February 1, 1964; asset data from The Fortune Directory,
(Time, Inc., August, 1962).
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